Abstract
The future of joint UK–EU work on sanctions faces substantial risk.
Notes
1 Alex Barker, ‘EU and UK Seek Speedy Brexit Deal on Defence and Security’, Financial Times, 4 February 2018.
2 See, for example, the speech given by UK Prime Minister Theresa May at the Munich Security Conference on 17 February 2018, in which she said the UK ‘will want to continue to work closely’ with the EU on sanctions and ‘will look to carry over all EU sanctions at the time of our departure’ (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-munich-security-conference-17-february-2018). Similarly, in a speech on 14 February 2018, UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said that after Brexit ‘it would be illogical not to discuss such matters as sanctions together, bearing in mind that UK expertise provides more than half of all EU sanctions listings’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V-LEkBnyn5A).
3 This is according to a senior British official.
4 Erica Mort and Patryk Pawlak, ‘The EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox: Towards a Cyber Sanctions Regime’, European Union Institute for Strategic Studies (EUISS), Brief No. 24, 12 July 2017, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_24_Cyber_sanctions.pdf.
5 Ross Denton, Partner, Baker and McKenzie LP, corrected oral evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, Evidence Session No. 1, 20 July 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/written-evidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/oral/69306.html.
6 The EU currently implements some 15 UN-approved sanctions regimes, covering around 200 countries. Six of these are solely UN measures (including Mali), and nine are UN measures complemented by additional autonomous EU sanctions (as in the cases of North Korea and Iran). Eighteen autonomous EU sanctions regimes have been imposed in the absence of UN sanctions, which only have effect in EU member states. These regimes mainly involve asset freezes, travel bans, arms restrictions and some wider sectoral sanctions, for example on finance or specific areas of trade, and include the sanctions placed on Syria and Russia. Such regimes are typically matched by the US and other allies. The UK currently has autonomous powers to freeze terrorist assets (which are restricted to some 20 individuals and entities) and to enact sanctions in certain cases of nuclear non-proliferation and weapons of mass destruction. The UK also implements arms embargoes linked to Armenia and Azerbaijan through the OSCE.
7 Roger Matthews, Dechert Senior Director, corrected oral evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, Evidence Session No. 4, 12 October 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/oral/71365.html.
8 Ibid.
9 Matthew Findlay, Deputy Head of International Organisations Department, FCO, corrected oral evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, Evidence Session No. 3, 14 September 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/oral/70460.html.
10 Matthews, corrected oral evidence.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Rena Lalgie, Head of the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, corrected oral evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, Evidence Session No. 3, 14 September 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/written-evidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/oral/70460.html.
15 Seth Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), cited in Clara Portela, written evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, 24 July 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeee-vidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/written/69280.pd.
16 The UK has played a direct role in talks with Iran since 2003, along with France and Germany, through the E3 process. While initially reluctant, it became a strong advocate for the use of sanctions against Iran beginning in 2005. The three European powers then joined forces with the US, Russia and China (E3 + 3 or P5 + 1, and later the E3/EU + 3).
17 The UK successfully pressured the EU to alter its sanctions regime in the case of Syria in relation to its arms embargo that was allowing one side of the conflict to continue accessing weapons. Francesco Giumelli, corrected oral evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, Evidence Session No. 2, 20 July 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/written-evidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/oral/69307.html.
18 Erica Moret, ‘What Would Brexit Mean for EU Sanctions Policy?’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 23 March 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_what_would_brexit_mean_for_eu_sanctions_policy6046?src=ilaw.
19 Erica Moret and Shagina Maria, ‘The Impact of EU–Russia Tensions on the Economy of the EU’, in Lukasz, Kulesa, Ivan Timofeev and Joseph Dobbs (eds), Damage Assessment: EU–Russia Relations in Crisis (London: European Leadership Network, 2017), pp. 17–24, https://www.european-leadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/170615-ELN-RIAC-Damage-Assessment-EU-Russia-Relations-in-Crisis.pdf.
20 Erica Moret, written evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, http://data.parliament.uk/written-evidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/written/70456.pdf July 2017.
21 Erica Moret, Francesco Giumelli and Dawid Bastiat-Jarosz, ‘Sanctions on Russia: Impacts and Economic Costs on the United States’, Programme for the Study of International Governance, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 20 March 2017, http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/internationalgovernance/shared/Russian-Sanctions-Report.pdf.
22 Erica Moret et al., , ‘The New Deterrent? International Sanctions Against Russia Over the Ukraine Crisis: Impacts, Costs and Further Action’, Programme for the Study of International Governance, Graduate Institute, Geneva, 12 October 2016, http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/internationalgovernance/shared/The%20New%20Deterrent%20International%20Sanctions%20Against%20Russia%20Over%20the%20Ukraine%20Crisis%20-%20Impacts%2c%20Costs%20and%20Further%20Action.pdf.
23 Matthews, corrected oral evidence.
24 House of Lords, European Union Committee, ‘The Legality of EU Sanctions’, HL Paper 102, 2 February 2017, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeu-com/102/102.pdf.
25 Maya Lester QC, Barrister, Brick Court Chambers, corrected oral evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, Evidence Session No. 1, 20 July 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/written-evidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/oral/69306.html.
26 Maya Lester QC, written evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, 26 July 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/written/69281.pdf.
27 Mikael Eriksson, Researcher, Swedish Defence Research Agency, written evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, 26 July 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeee-vidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/written/69282.pdf.
28 Lester, written evidence.
29 House of Lords, ‘Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]: Explanatory Notes’, 24 January 2018, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-2019/0157/en/18157en.pdf.
30 UK Finance, ‘Impact of Brexit on the Future Application of UK Sanctions’, Parliamentary Briefing, 16 November 2017.
31 Question raised by UK Finance in its written evidence to Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, 19 September 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/written-evidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/written/70455.pdf.
32 Paul Williams, Director Multilateral Policy, FCO, corrected oral evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, Evidence Session No. 3, 14 September 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/oral/70460.html.
33 Authors’ conversations with senior British officials.
34 Richard Nephew and David Mortlock, Brexit’s Implications for UK and European Sanctions Policy (New York: Columbia University, Center on Global Energy Policy, October 2016).
35 Authors’ conversations with EU member-state officials.
36 UK Finance, written evidence.
37 Findlay, corrected oral evidence.
38 Embassy of Switzerland in the United Kingdom, written evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, 19 September 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/written-evidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/written/70458.pdf.
39 Royal Norwegian Embassy, written evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, 12 October 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/written-evidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/written/71045.pdf.
40 Matthews, corrected oral evidence.
41 Embassy of Switzerland in the United Kingdom, written evidence.
42 Royal Norwegian Embassy, written evidence.
43 Based on interviews held in 2015–17 with EU, US and third-country officials working on sanctions implementation.
44 Department for Exiting the European Union, ‘Foreign Policy, Defence and Development: A Future Partnership Paper’, 12 September 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/643924/Foreign_policy_defence_and_development_paper.pdf.
45 Caroline Wilson CMG, Director Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, corrected oral evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, Evidence Session No. 6, 26 October 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/written-evidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/oral/72304.html.
46 Sir Alan Duncan MP, Minister for Europe and the Americas, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, corrected oral evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, Evidence Session No. 6, 26 October 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/oral/72304.html.
47 Nephew and Mortlock, Brexit’s Implications for UK and European Sanctions Policy, p. 3.
48 Lester, written evidence.
49 Sir John Sawers GCMG, former chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), corrected oral evidence, Select Committee on the European Union, External Affairs Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Sanctions Policy’, Evidence Session No. 5, 19 October 2017, p. 14, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/oral/71916.html.
50 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘The Future of UK Diplomacy in Europe’, Second Report of Session 2017–19, 30 January 2018, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/514/514.pdf.
51 Findlay, corrected oral evidence.
52 Erica Moret, ‘Effective Minilateralism for the EU: What, When and How’, European Union Institute for Security Studies Brief, No. 17, 3 June 2016, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_17_Minilateralism.pdf.
53 Theresa May, ‘PM Speech at Munich Security Conference: 17 February 2018’, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-munich-security-conference-17-february-2018.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Erica Moret
Erica Moret is Senior Researcher at the Global Governance Centre at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies and chair of the Geneva International Sanctions Network.
Fabrice Pothier
Fabrice Pothier is senior consulting fellow at IISS, Chief Strategy Officer at Rasmussen Global, and was from 2010 to 2016 head of policy planning for the NATO secretary-general.